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Some of the biggest social media platforms recently decided to suspend the
accounts of former US President Donald Trump. Even though such bans are not
unprecedented (see a list by Jillian C. York), the fact that it concerned the then-
still US President has triggered quite some controversy. This blog post examines
the situation from the European perspective, specifically the right to freedom of
expression protected by Article 10 ECHR. Would the doctrine of positive obligations
mean that Donald Trump’s right to freedom of expression was violated?
No censorship under US law
After the events of 6 January 2021, President Trump had (among others) his
Facebook and Twitter accounts suspended or permanently banned. A move
applauded by those who for the last 4 years have been accusing Trump of
continuous violations of the platforms’ Terms & Conditions was considered
unacceptable censorship by others (see here and here). Numerous experts rushed
to explain that under US law the move does, in fact, not constitute a violation of
the 1st Amendment, since there was no state action (see here). Moreover, when
private online platforms remove users’ content, even if it happens to be the US
President, they are protected by both 1st Amendment and Section 230. Coming from
the European perspective, I would like to look at the situation through the lenses of
Article 10 ECHR and the doctrine of positive obligations.
Obligation to protect the right to freedom of
expression
The right to freedom of expression, under the ECHR, is not absolute. Restrictions
could take the form of ‘formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties’ (Article 10
para. 2 ECHR), and are permissible if they comply with three conditions: They must
be (1) prescribed by law, (2) introduced for protection of one of the listed legitimate
aims, and (3) necessary in a democratic society. Legitimate grounds that could
justify interference include national security, territorial integrity or public safety, and
the prevention of disorder or crime.
The right to freedom of expression under the ECHR has, first and foremost, a
negative obligation, meaning that states cannot unduly restrict the right. In Europe
the right also entails a positive obligation. States are required to also protect the right
from interference by others, including by private companies or individuals. Extending
the scope of the ECHR to private relationships between individuals is referred to
as the “horizontal effect”. According to the interpretation of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), the horizontal effect is indirect, meaning that individuals can
enforce human rights provisions against other individuals only indirectly, by relying
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on the positive obligations of the State. Interference with the Convention rights by
an individual may be attributed to the State, which failed to prevent the interference.
The ECtHR specifically found the positive obligation present in relation to the right to
freedom of expression (e.g. Dink v. Turkey). The duty to protect the right to freedom
of expression involves an obligation for governments to promote this right and to
provide for an environment where it can be effectively exercised without being
unduly curtailed. Examples include cases of states’ failure to implement measures
protecting journalists against unlawful violent attacks (Özgür Gündem v. Turkey), or
failure to enact legislation resulting in refusal to broadcast by a commercial television
company (Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz v. Switzerland).
The doctrine of positive obligations and the horizontal effect of the ECHR could
support the argument that rules may be necessary to prevent arbitrary decisions
by platforms to remove content (or ban users). But how far would this argument
stretch? Does the horizontal effect of the ECHR mean that “deplatforming” Donald
Trump constitutes a violation of his right to freedom of expression? And further,
would European States be able introduce some type of “must-carry” obligations for
online platforms to protect certain categories of speakers (e.g. politicians) to ensure
effective enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression? As always, the answer is
complicated.
No freedom of forum
Despite the existence of positive obligations, the ECtHR has ruled that Article 10
does not provide any “freedom of forum” for the exercise of the right to freedom
of expression. This means that Article 10 ECHR does not guarantee any right to
have one’s content broadcasted on any particular private forum. Private platforms,
therefore, cannot be forced to carry content by third parties, even if that content is
not actually illegal. This is only logical. It is hard to imagine that a platform for dog
owners would be forced to allow cat pictures (despite what internet cat overlords
might think about that).
Such an obligation would involve a conflict between the right to freedom of
expression and the right to private property and to conduct business (Article 16
ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR). An attempt to protect the former
would amount to interference with the latter. In a case concerning prohibition to
distribute leaflets in a private shopping centre (Appleby and others v. the UK),
the Court did not consider lack of State’s protection as a failure to comply with
positive obligation to protect Article 10 ECHR. This was because the Court also
considered that a lack of protection did not destroy the “essence” of the right to
freedom of expression. However, the Court did not entirely exclude that “a positive
obligation could arise for the State to protect the enjoyment of the Convention
rights by regulating property rights”. Indeed, such was the Court’s decision in
Khurshid Mustafa & Tarzibachi, which involved termination of a tenancy agreement
because of the tenants’ refusal to dismantle a satellite dish installed to receive
television programmes from the tenants’ native country. To decide which right
takes precedence in particular circumstances, the Court conducts a test of “viable
alternatives”. The Court analyses if parties were able to exercise their right to
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freedom of expression through alternative means. In Appleby such alternative
expression opportunities existed, while in Tarzibachi the Court found that even
though different methods existed, they were not functionally equivalent to a satellite
dish.
What does this mean for Trump’s ban on Twitter and Facebook? Clearly, as the
then-President of the USA, Trump had ample opportunities to communicate his
message to the world, whether through a friendly broadcaster or an official press
conference. While it could be argued that the existing alternatives are not equivalent
to the most popular social media platforms, it would be hard to argue that the
essence of the right to freedom of expression was destroyed. For an ex-President,
some expression opportunities might be limited but Trump’s options still put him in
advantage in comparison with an average unknown user deplatformed by Twitter
or Facebook. These bans do happen, whether for clear violations of the Terms
and Conditions or the most absurd reasons. Yet, they rarely reach similar levels of
controversy.
We should also not forget that Trump has a long history of tweets that violate
platforms’ Terms and Conditions. Not banning him earlier was a result of special
treatment – an exception attributed to the newsworthiness and public interest of his
tweets. For comparison, an unrelated account which tweeted the exact same words
as the President got suspended within 3 days (for glorifying violence). Although
Twitter’s bending of its own rules has been criticized by many, it is not entirely
unreasonable to leave more room to the content of the President of the USA. But
even Twitter’s patience reached its limits when the President’s comments amounted
to incitement to insurrection.
Article 10 ECHR protects expression that offends, shocks or disturbs. The scope
for restrictions on political speech is narrow and requires strict scrutiny. However,
hate speech and incitement to violence do not constitute an expression worthy
of protection (see here). The ECHR does not provide a specific definition of hate
speech but instead prefers a case-by-case approach. Moreover, per Article 17
ECHR, the Convention does not protect any activity aimed at the destruction of any
of the rights and freedoms contained in the Convention, to prevent the so-called
“paradox of tolerance”. This provision has been interpreted to exclude protection
of speech that endangers free operation of democratic institutions or attempts to
destroy the stability and effectiveness of a democratic system. It goes beyond the
scope of this blog post to analyse if Trump’s tweets and posts actually fall within this
category of expression, but the mere possibility of such qualification shows that his
speech is not merely controversial. Thus, it is not unthinkable for platforms to prohibit
it through their internal rules.
Europe against censorship?
Under the ECHR, the banning of Trump’s accounts could be viewed as an
interference with his right to freedom of expression. However, private entities are not
bound by the ECHR and its horizontal effect is only indirect. The only option under
Article 10, therefore, would be to attribute the interference to states, for failure to
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effectively protected Trump’s rights. But again, the right to freedom of expression
under ECHR is not absolute. This means that not every interference is considered a
violation. The circumstances of the present case (including the context and impact of
Trump’s speech), makes a qualification as a violation seem unlikely.
I have previously argued that states should introduce laws to ensure more protection
of online expression in order to comply with their positive obligations under Article 10
ECHR. It would be hard to imagine, however, that such laws would force platforms
to carry all and any content by one privileged group of users, such as politicians or
heads of states. Especially so, if the content amounted to hate speech or incitement
to violence. Nevertheless, some politicians have proposed laws that would prohibit
removal of speech that is not explicitly considered hate speech by national legislation
(which would have provided protection to Donald Trump’s tweets as well as speech
targeting minority communities, see more here).
Following the decisions to ban Trump’s accounts, policymakers around the world
have expressed their concern about the immense power of private platforms to
“silence” world leaders (see here, here and here). The strong pro-speech stance
of EU politicians is commendable, but not exactly consistent with a general trend
in recent years. For some time now, European politicians and the EU have been
trying to convince online platforms to “do more” to police content of their users.
National laws such as the German NetzDG, the Austrian KoPlG and the French Avia
Bill all require more effective moderation of online spaces. This means, more and
faster removals. Under the threat of high fines, these laws require platforms to limit
dissemination of illegal content as well as harmful content, such as disinformation.
In an attempt to catch up with national legislations, the EU has been steadily
introducing mechanisms encouraging online platforms to (more or less) voluntarily
moderate content, for example the 2016  Code of Conduct on hate speech, the
2018 Code of Practice on Disinformation, the update to the AVMS Directive and the
proposal on Terrorist Content Regulation (currently in the final stages of negotiation).
One would think that Twitter’s proactive approach, in light of these initiatives, would
be appreciated. The somewhat confusing political reaction has led to questions
whether the recently proposed Digital Services Act (DSA) would address the
problem of powerful platforms making arbitrary decisions about speech they allow
online.
The DSA aims to rebalance the responsibilities of users, platforms and public
authorities according to European values. It includes mechanisms to encourage
online platforms to conduct voluntary monitoring and moderation of the hosted
content, in particular in Article 6. A strong risk exists that such an encouragement
would lead to more private censorship (see my analysis here). At the same time, the
DSA clearly states that its goal is to ensure more protection for fundamental rights
online. Recital 22, in particular, states that the “removal or disabling of access should
be undertaken in the observance of the principle of freedom of expression”.  How
could the DSA ensure more protection to the right to freedom of expression, and
what would it mean for banned accounts? Would it privilege certain actors?
The DSA’s contribution to more effective protection of the freedom of expression
comes in form of procedural safeguards. These strengthen due process, clarify
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notice and take down procedures, improve transparency of the decision making
and ensure redress mechanism for removal or blocking decisions. It will not prohibit
Twitter from introducing its own internal rules but will require that the rules are
clear and unambiguous and applied in proportionate manner (Article 12 DSA).
Any blocked user would also have to be informed about the reasons for blocking
and possibilities to appeal the decision, e.g. through internal complaint-handling
mechanisms, out-of-court dispute settlement and judicial redress (Article 15). The
goal of the introduced safeguards, therefore, is to regulate the process and not to
regulate the speech. Adding these safeguards could have an overall positive effect
on the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression. This positive effect would
be achieved without introducing any must-carry rules for certain types of content
(e.g. speech by heads of states) that could potentially interfere with other rights and
interests at stake.
Conclusion
Donald Trump’s presidency came to an end last week. The decision to suspend his
Facebook account has been now referred to the Oversight Board and his Twitter
account remains suspended. Despite the initial surprise, we are slowly getting
used to hearing less from him. Politicians around the world, however, might be still
struggling with the effect. This is, therefore, a good moment for reflection on their
side: do they want online platforms to remove (or ban) more and faster? Or do they
want more increased protection of the right to freedom of expression, but only for
themselves and their supporters? It will be interesting to see how the discussion
unfolds, especially in the context of the DSA. But surely certain stakeholders must be
starting to realize that it might be difficult to have your cake and eat it too.
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